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Rethinking Selectivism and
Selectivity by Means Test
CHACK-KIE WONG
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Department of Social Work
This article casts doubt on conventional thinking about selectivism and
its narrow focus on the selective process. It is argued that selectivity
is fairly neutral; even universal access to welfare is not free from the
attachment of social stigma to welfare beneficiaries. The increase in benefits
standards, another common strategy advocated by egalitarians, may not
produce the desirable de-stigmatized effect for beneficiaries. Our status
ranking conception of social relations, reflecting the operation of the success
ideology, holds the key to the transfer of social stigma in the social exchange
of welfare benefits. In this regard, we need .to study the relation between
the selective process and its ideological and institutional context, as well
as the case for the conditional use of selectivity by means test.
Introduction
The study of selectivism and universalism is often reduced to
the study of selective means. This seems to arise from equating
selectivism to selectivity, resulting in the focus on technical issues,
such as the stigmatizing and divisive social effects of different se-
lective means. Indeed, universality and selectivity are distributive
methods. When relating distributive methods to values and be-
liefs, universality and selectivity are turned into universalism and
selectivism respectively. If they are put into models of institutional
arrangements, universalism is associated with 'institutional' wel-
fare whereas selectivism is often referred to as 'residual' welfare. A
literature review of these sets of concepts found that few scholars
argued for selectivism, selectivity and residual welfare. This may
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be due to the perception that selectivity, often regarded as equiva-
lent to means test, is 'controlling, condescending, and dehuman-
izing' of the recipient (Kohlert, 1989, p. 303); it is also socially
divisive by creating a stigmatized class of suspected scroungers
(Alcock, 1987, pp. 118-122). It is also suggested that the means
test and its associated problems of social division, low take-up
rates and poverty traps are unlikely to diminish in the future;
and paradoxically, despite its discredited past, the means test has
an expanding future (Deacon & Bradshaw, 1983: 204). However,
selectivity should not be taken to be equivalent to selectivism,
and a means test is only one of the methods used in the selection
process.
Despite all the perceptions of serious shortcomings associated
with the selective stream of welfare, there are a few attempts
to recast it with a positive image. Hoshino (1969, p. 254) no-
ticed nearly three decades ago, that selectivity by means test on
university students for financial aids (loans and grants) did not
appear to attract stigma to them. Selectivity, even by a means
test, is not necessarily dehumanizing and socially divisive. More
recently, a comparative study on income transfers for families in
eight countries by Kamerman and Kahn (1987, p. 279) found that
selective means by the use of an income test was not necessarily
stigmatizing and socially divisive.
Another approach to recast the selectivist stream of welfare
with a positive flavor is to reverse negative selection by positive
selection, and then deliberately to provide the beneficiaries with
additional resources. In Britain, this endeavor is called positive
discrimination; whereas in the United States, it is often put under
the category of reverse discrimination or affirmative action (Ed-
wards, 1988; Miller, 1973). The concept of positive discrimination
came from the Plowden Report's recommendation for allocating
additional resources to 'Educational Priority Areas' to combat
social deprivations in Britain (Batley, 1978; Edwards, 1988, p. 211;
Smith, 1977). As acclaimed by one prominent advocate, positive
discrimination is 'the only form of selectivity compatible with
the idea of a welfare society because its ultimate goal is the
achievement of optimal rather than minimal standards' (Pinker,
1971, p. 190).
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Despite all these attempts, selectivity is still widely conceived
negatively (Butler & Weatherley, 1992; Kamerman & Kahn, 1988;
Kohlert, 1989). Any attempt to use a means test or income test
is often categorized as 'residualisation' especially in those policy
initiatives classified as privatization (Flynn, 1988; Peach & By-
ron, 1994). Even positive discrimination, the well-intended social
policy initiative to provide better resources for the deprived, is
labeled in the public discourse as discouraging self-reliance, anti-
meritocracy and denying the deprived groups 'the opportunity to
make it without government's patronizing help' (The Economist,
15 June 1996, p. 36). It seems that the modification of the selective
means or the gradation of benefits standards may not be the right
answer to combat stigmatization of the poor and disadvantaged
groups.
The negative conception of the selective stream of welfare
may be due to the historical heritage embodied in the Poor Laws
(Batley, 1978; Kohlert, 1989), and its association with the use of
a means test in granting benefits to the poor (for example, see
Deacon & Bradshaw, 1983; Kamerman & Kahn, 1987, p. 277;
Mishra, 1977; Titmuss, 1968, 1974; Wilensky & Lebeaux, 1965).
Despite its negative connotations in mainstream social policy
analysis, the selective approach of welfare, residual welfare in
particular, has not disappeared. On the contrary, it is gaining
greater usage by Western governments. For instance, a means
tested element is incorporated into the social security system in
Britain by the justification of targeting benefits to those in greatest
need (George & Miller, 1994, p. 30). The government reaction in
the West could be seen as a response to some contextual changes of
post-war Western welfare capitalism. First, it is the relative decline
of economic competitiveness due to an increasingly globalised
economy, thus, funds from the economy and taxes for public
welfare are regarded as less economically and politically viable.
Second, social class diversification due to the post-Fordist pro-
duction pattern weakens support for universal welfare (George
& Miller, 1994; Mishra, 1990; Murray, 1989, p. 46). In the East,
without the post-war welfare state consensus and the developing
nature of the economy, governments and the public alike, both
seem to be more concerned about focusing public welfare on those
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who are in greatest need. In this respect, the selectivist approach
to welfare is apparently more welcome, East and West, than the
universal one, primarily on the assumption that it is more cost
efficient than the universal approach.
In other words, if the selective approach to welfare is here
to stay and seems to be widely used despite its 'discredited
past', a critical examination of it is necessary and valuable. On
this understanding, this paper examines the arguments for selec-
tivism, on both normative and utilitarian grounds; then, it criti-
cally examines selectivism in the objective to identify the source
of its negative conception. The use of selectivism as the focus of
analysis represents the core argument of this paper: the negative
conception of selectivity and selective welfare (e.g. the residual
approach and the means test) is related more to our ideological
construction than to benefits standard and selective means. The
focus of the selectivity study on the selective process seems to be
too narrow.
Examining the Normative Arguments for Selectivism
A strong normative argument for selectivism derives from the
Aristotelian notion of social justice (Edwards, 1987; Spicker, 1985,
p. 6): the needs principle in distributing social resources and bur-
den because people have different needs; it is socially just to treat
alike as alike, unalike as different. Therefore, equal treatment can
be socially unjust. This is very similar to the Rawlsian principle
of justice which also embraces unequal treatment on the basis
of the different conditions people have (Rawls, 1971, pp. 60-65).
Rawls is concerned with injustice caused by the basic structure of
society (Iatridis, 1994, p. 67). If social and economic inequalities
are not to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected
to everyone's advantages or disadvantages, positive action for
the needy or the disadvantaged is required for corrective justice.
This structural approach to justice suggests that fair opportuni-
ties are not sufficient and the unfair distribution of fundamental
rights and duties as caused by institutional arrangements have
to be altered or even abolished. In other words, selectivity has
an essential role to play in redistributing rights and duties for
corrective justice.
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The other normative argument for selectivism is derived from
particularism, which can be categorized as a conservative ap-
proach. Particularism assumes that values and norms must be
context-specific (Spicker, 1994, p. 7). They are evolved from spe-
cific social relations, networks and traditions. In other words,
there can be inconsistent rules arisen from diversity in social
context. Thus, selection on the basis of particularism shares the
similar ideological root with the European idea of 'solidarity'
(Spicker, 1991, p. 17), a communitarian ideology. 'Solidarity' as
mutualism denotes the mutual obligations of those in the social
network (Spicker, 1992). Belonging to the network is the prerequi-
site for benefits and mutual obligations, and these are exclusive to
non-members. In this light, particularism suggests the notion that
'rights and obligations are not general, but dependent on specific
links between people in different social contexts' (Spicker, 1994,
p. 13). Apparently, inconsistent rules may result in discrimination
against some based on selectivity.
The specificity of rights and responsibilities in relation to
social context implies that social rights are conditional. This is in
contrast with the notion that social rights are universal and intrin-
sic to the person who makes the claims (Drover and Kerans, 1993,
p. 3). Apparently, the context-specific justification for selectivism
would become problematic if it turns out to discriminate non-
members or members of the community who are under-achievers
or non-performers of certain community defined obligations.
Separatism and racism are examples of the moral weakness of
this approach (Spicker, 1994, p. 13). Apparently, a community
with context-specific rights and obligations may be a system with
notorious restrictions on freedom (Gunsteren, 1994, p. 42). Never-
theless, communities with political democracy are less restrictive
on personal freedom because of the guarantees by civil rights, and
the state acts as the protector of individuals' basic rights. The state
can arbitrate and coerce lower level collectivities to comply with a
number of basic guarantees for all. With all these state protections,
individuals can have the freedom to join or leave a community at
their will. In sum, it becomes clear that selectivism can be morally
justified on the normative principle of corrective justice; however,
its potentially discriminatory practice against non-members and
under-achieving members has to be taken into account.
124 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Examining the Utilitarian Arguments for Selectivism
The objection to selectivism primarily arises from the use
of particular selective means, e.g. means test or income test,
for distributing social services and benefits to beneficiaries. This
is particular about the residual model of welfare, which relies
primarily on the market and the family for the fulfillment of
human needs, and the state comes into help only if these social
institutions fail. In this welfare model, the means test is primarily
used to differentiate the deserving poor from the undeserving
ones. Indeed, its problems are the negative effects residual welfare
is assumed to impose upon the beneficiaries (Batley, 1978, p. 311;
Deacon & Bradshaw, 1983; Mishra, 1987). First, it offers the lowest
possible minimum standards to recipients in order to discourage
them from dependence on the dole. Secondly, recipients are down
graded or humiliated by the means testing process. As suggested
by Pinker (1968), this is the exclusive approach to selectivity with
the objective of deterring potential applicants by attaching social
stigma or even causing hardship on recipients. These objections
to residualism are premised on the egalitarian principle, that
welfare beneficiaries should also be fairly treated despite their
lack of ability compared with the others in the market system.
To correct these inegalitarian wrongs, another selective approach
by the name of positive discrimination is called upon to redress
the imbalance of treatments, opportunities and social resources
between the disadvantaged groups and those of the larger society.
Because of the claimed objectives for social equality, positive
discrimination as a selective approach gains wider acceptance. It
is about the use of state intervention for enhancing social equality.
According to Pinker (1971), this is an inclusive selectivity. For its
protagonists, it can be a form of identifying recipients with 'a pro-
cess of diagnosis and selection free from stigmatization' (Titmuss,
1968, p. 134). More important, positive discrimination aims at 'the
achievement of optimal rather than minimal standards' (Pinker,
1971, p. 190). The assumption of positive discrimination as a non-
stigmatizing selective process is the non-specificity of both bene-
ficiaries and benefits (Edwards, 1987, p. 27). The achievement of
this relies upon benefits and beneficiaries as exclusively commu-
nal or collective in nature. It is assumed that, on the one hand, by
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giving benefits to a group based on some proxy of disadvantages
or vulnerabilities as the criteria of selection, the stigmatized effect
of means test on individual beneficiaries can be avoided. Thus,
the issue of disincentive to take-up is likely to disappear. On the
other hand, benefits that are collectively consumed can increase
public acceptance (Edwards, 1987, pp. 26-27). This suggests that
the social division, or dualism, between the stigmatized groups
and the others of the larger society may vanish.
In this light, positive discrimination, as a selective approach,
aims at avoiding social stigma and, at the same time, transferring
additional resources to beneficiaries of the identified disadvan-
taged groups. However, positive discrimination intending as a
non-stigmatizing selective approach has its problems. It does not
have an objective method of measuring the disadvantaged status.
It is because not all members of a group are needy; and the extent
of the concentration of disadvantages or vulnerabilities to justify
positive discrimination status is nevertheless arbitrary (Edwards,
1988). Apart from the measurement difficulties of the collective
selective means, its primary objective as a non-stigmatized se-
lective approach is also doubted. In the eyes of the majority,
the groups may still be perceived as of lower status; even the
groups may perceive themselves the same way (Edwards, 1988).
Furthermore, it is also accused as anti-meritocracy, that is the
lowering of performance standards (Miller, 1973).
Although positive discrimination is presented as a non-stig-
matizing selectivity, it has not totally avoided the negative image
imposed on selective means such as the means test and income
test. This suggests that the efforts of affirmative action by allo-
cating additional resources are not the effective solution to the
problems of stigmatization and social divisiveness.
Selectivism and Stigmatization
In the above section, we briefly examined the normative and
utilitarian arguments for selectivism. In residual welfare, it is the
market-dominated system that predominantly dictates the label-
ing of welfare beneficiaries with a social stigma. Apparently, it is
the reliance on the state as an indication of failure-the inability to
compete-that is stigmatizing. The stratification of people accord-
ing to market ability is the prime source of stigmatization. Even in
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positive discrimination, the beneficiaries as a social group are not
perceived in isolation of the institutional context they are located:
they are regarded as less equal in market ability than the rest who
depend on their own efforts and without additional resources
transferred from the state. Ironically, the transfer of additional
resources serves to reinforce the perception of the beneficiaries as
less adequate, or equal, than the 'normal' category of people who
do not require the 'patronizing help' of the state.
However, not all transfers by the state are perceived as em-
bodying the attribute of dependence or the inability to compete
in the economic market. For example, tax expenditures on the
whole are not percieved negatively; thus, the beneficiaries are
not stigmatized. Two reasons seem to account for the explanation
of the non-stigmatizing nature of tax expenditures. First, they
are primarily a hidden form of benefits; therefore, the benefi-
ciaries are also hidden from public scrutiny despite there are
enormous benefits involved in the transfer. For example, one
estimate puts tax expenditures up to 14 per cent of Gross Do-
mestic Product in Denmark (1989), 9 per cent and and 6 per cent
in the United Kingdom (1990) and in the United States (1990)
respectively (Kvist & Sinfield, 1996). Second, many of them are
related to employment status (e.g. tax-deductible unemployment
benefits, tax free or deductive contributions to pension and health
insurances); hence, their clear association with the concepts of
contribution and ability to compete in the economic market is also
non-stigmatizing for the beneficiaries. The above brief analysis
of how and why beneficiaries are stigmatized or not stigmatized
reveals the argument that status ranking according to competence
seems to hold the key to our understanding of the attachment of
social stigma on welfare beneficiaries in society. In this regard, we
have to examine the part played by status in selectivism.
In residualism, stigma is attached to beneficiaries to dis-
courage them from welfare dependence. Competence or ability
primarily determines status ranking in the market system. Em-
ployment status is indicative. The non-employed such as the
retired and housewives are generally regarded as less socially
prestigious than the employed. In other words, their relation
to the market system judges them. In the same light, if welfare
beneficiaries can possess the quality of competence and ability,
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they may not be stigmatized. Hoshino's (1969) observation on
financial aid to low-income university students is a case in point.
The means tested or income tested financial aid to university
students may not produce social stigma because the beneficia-
ries also possess status-enhancing factors. Nevertheless, it does
not mean that the means tested selection method is not stig-
matizing. Students and their parents may feel stigmatized by
the application process. However, this is unlike welfare benefits
such as social assistance, which also transfer to beneficiaries a
social status with the perceived quality of dependence on the
state for basic living even after the selection process. In contrast,
the selective process for applying loans and grants does not
alter the status of a university student. The focus on the one-
off selective process seems to be too narrow for the explanation
of stigmatization.
The other way to avoid social stigma is by universal provision.
Universal welfare assumes individuals within the community
do not have the boundary (such as means test or income test)
to get across for the accessibility of benefits. In this regard, the
factor of population wide coverage, because of its equalizing
effect, is helpful in diluting an image of inferior status: the more
people in the community as beneficiaries, the more widespread
the recipient status. In other words, stigma, in this context, is a
result of the classification of people into hierarchical categories.
This is definitely related to the use of selective means. In uni-
versalism, the accessibility to benefits is based on unconditional
social rights; then, it is not necessary for any selective means,
e.g. means test or income test, to differentiate the beneficiaries
from the others within the same group of people. Even if selec-
tive means are used, the negative effects can be neutralized if a
large section of the population can be included. Kamerman and
Kahn's (1987) finding of the non-stigmatizing income transfer for
families with vulnerabilities is a case in point. Singapore's public
home ownership scheme is also illustrative: it is means tested,
but except for a few high income groups, the large majority of the
population are eligible for the purchase of the government built
but subsidized properties.' Definitely, the coverage of the benefits
is helpful in diluting or even eliminating social stigma attached to
beneficiaries of public welfare. Once again, it is worthy to notice
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that, the means tested selective process is not a sufficient condition
for the transfer of social stigma to beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, a wide coverage is no guarantee of a stigma-
free status for beneficiaries. It is because stigmatization also has
another theoretical explanation. Indeed, it can also be regarded as
reflecting the perception that the transfer of benefits is unilateral,
that the beneficiaries do not have the corresponding obligation or
ability to exchange (Pinker, 1971, p. 136; Plant, Lesser & Taylor-
Gooby, 1980, pp. 22-24). Charities and social assistance benefits
are examples of unilateral transfer: recipients are perceived as
lacking the ability to reciprocate. In contrast, social stigma is
generally not attached to bilateral exchanges in market transac-
tions. For example, despite state subsidies for home ownership,
beneficiaries of this kind are not perceived as lacking the ability to
reciprocate in this social exchange in properties. In this regard, the
perception that the possession of certain personal attributes, e.g.
the inability to compete or the inability to pay, by the beneficiaries
seems to constitute the basis of the hierarchical categorization of
social status.
On this basis, even if welfare benefits are claimed as an uncon-
ditional social right, social stigma can still is attached to beneficia-
ries (Jones, 1980, pp. 140-142). Social stigma that has arisen from
attributes related to welfare benefits can be diluted because the
transfer can enhance their benefits standard. Poor housing, poor
health, low income are examples of this range of attributes extrin-
sic to the beneficiaries. However, uplifting of housing, health and
income benefits may not be totally helpful for the beneficiaries if
they possess some personal characteristics, which are perceived
as socially inferior. Take people with physical impairment for ex-
ample; the attribute of disability is still stigmatizing. Similarly, the
social stigma arisen from the perception of the lack of will power
of the unemployed cannot be eliminated by generous benefits. In
this regard, it is important to identify the kinds of attributes that
contribute to the perception of social stigma. Some disadvantaged
groups are perceived as less equal or less favorable as others
(Jones, 1980: 140) because they are regarded as possessing some
intrinsic attributes. The equalization of welfare benefits by the
process of universality may not be able to eradicate social stigma
attached to those attributes associated with the perception of
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inferior personal qualities. Equally clearly, the increase in benefits
standard may not be helpful. This does not mean that the standard
of benefits is not important, it is important to improve the material
and social conditions of the beneficiaries, but it is not relevant to
their stigmatizing attributes.
It can be generalized that there are two types of attributes
contributing to the stigmatization of beneficiaries as the pos-
sessors of inferior status. The first type is extrinsic attributes
of beneficiaries such as income, health and education; they are
primarily selectivity-related welfare benefits that can be redis-
tributed by state action. People in poverty can be provided with
better conditions in housing, health care, education and income;
and their improved material and social conditions are very likely
helpful for the lowering of their social stigma. However, the
transfer of social services and benefits are not necessarily effective
to eradicate social stigma attached to beneficiaries, if they are
perceived as people without the ability to reciprocate (failure in
the economic market) or with personal characteristics perceived
as inferior (deficient natural endowment). The finding that social
stigma is affected by the degree of beneficiaries' dependence on
the benefits (Stuart, 1975) is a case in point. This means that, even
beneficiaries are provided with adequate provisions for meeting
all their social needs, social stigma is still attached to them. In
other words, the value of self-reliance, underpinned by the social
exchange thesis, plays an important role in stigmatization. This
seems to suggest that social stigma is socially and ideologically
constructed.
It is clear that intrinsic attributes of beneficiaries such as
disability--either in the market system or with natural deficiency,
are not necessarily directly related to the selective process. For
instance, the degree of disability is a selective means for disabil-
ity allowance; however, the beneficiaries seem to have already
carried with them the social stigma before they come into the
selective process. The selective process is apparently neutral to
stigmatization: even it is non-discretionary and non-humiliating,
the social stigma attached to beneficiaries does not go away. In
this regard, redistribution of tangible social services and benefits
are not effective to lower social stigma attached to beneficiaries
who are perceived as with inferior personal characteristics.
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The explanation of stigmatization as constituted from two
different sources helps to encompass the value dimension in the
analysis of this area. Take the example of unemployed benefits for
illustration. If the unemployed have demonstrated their efforts
to find jobs or taken up re-training programs, they are more
likely to be perceived as the deserving beneficiaries despite the
discretionary selective process. This illustrates that stigmatization
is related to the perception of the personal attributes of bene-
ficiaries, either held by the general public or conveyed to the
stigmatized by the media or the government. Ability, attitude
and behavior and the like are intrinsic attributes to define people
into hierarchical categories by the extent of their possession of
attributes. The hierarchical ordering according to these attributes
reflects the value for ability, achievement, productivity and self-
discipline. These are essential for the constitution of the 'success'
ideology: 'individual success results from ability plus hard work
and is a sign of virtue; failure results from laziness, incompetence,
and is a mark of vice'(Coughlin, 1980, p. 16). In other words, this
ideology personalizes individual success or failure; the social and
economic preconditions for success or failure are not taken into
consideration. People are not valued for being themselves; they
are valued for what they achieve, and for how they behave in the
process for attaining success or failure. This clearly illustrates that
social stigma is affected by the success ideology. The hierarchical
conception towards ability, attitude and behavior in relation to the
selective stream of welfare is an area that requires more attention
in social policy analysis.
Conclusion: Ideological and Institutional Context
for Selectivity and the Conditional Use of Means Test
This paper started with a brief review of the mainstream social
policy analysis on selectivism and identified its narrow focus on
the negative social effects of the selective means, particularly by
the use of means test and income test. Indeed, selectivism can be
justified on normative and utilitarian grounds. Corrective justice
and the linking of rights to obligations in the communitarian
stream of welfare were presented to support selectivism as a
defensible ideology for the organization of welfare. The examina-
tion of the utilitarian arguments for selectivism illustrated that,
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selectivity, in the case of positive discrimination, could be used
to select and transfer additional resources to the disadvantaged
groups. When we constructed selectivism, it became clear that
selectivity is not the only source of social stigma on welfare
beneficiaries. Indeed, selectivity can be neutral. Status ranking
is the key to our understanding how and why social stigma is
transferred. In addition, the level of benefits is not necessarily
related to social stigma. It is because the transfer by social policy
is about resources for improving material and social conditions.
It is not about any increase in capabilities of beneficiaries that can
enhance their status ranking to that of the others who can be self-
reliant, or able to engage in bilateral exchange in the economic
system. We also identified two types of stigmatizing attributes:
intrinsic and extrinsic ones. We found that intrinsic attributes
are not related to the selective process. Beneficiaries are already
stigmatized before they come to the selective process. This means
that the use of 'universal access', coupled with differential fee-
charging or taxing the benefits (Jacobs, 1993, pp. 202-206) cannot
be totally successful in avoiding stigma derived from intrinsic
attributes of beneficiaries.
In this light, the study of the selectivist stream of welfare
by focusing on the selective process is apparently too narrow.
We need to encompass the value dimension in the explanation
of social stigma attached to welfare beneficiaries. It seems that
'success ideology' is the source responsible for the constitution of
our status ranking conception of social relations. Success ideology
stands for the virtue of hard work and ability, which is widely
appreciated, even by egalitarians. Indeed, the acceptance of suc-
cess ideology is widespread across countries with different types
of welfare systems. Public attitude surveys found that people
tend to rank personal characteristics such as hard work, ambition,
natural ability and education as the important factors for 'getting
ahead'; and the difference among countries does not occur along
the pattern of political and economic system (Smith, 1989: 68). In
this regard, we need not to polarize success and equality. Peo-
ple in social democratic welfare states, despite their willingness
to pay heavier taxes as collective responsibility of their fellow
citizens for establishing the institution of the welfare state, do
not disregard personal efforts for success and achievement. In
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communist societies, equality is greatly emphasized and success
value plays a minor role; whilst in liberal and residual welfare
states, success is the core value and equality is seen primarily
as equal opportunity. In other words, equality (despite its many
versions) and success values co-exist in the same structures of
ideology and welfare institution; and they are in a pattern that
is complementary to each other. The opposition by egalitarians
towards success ideology is about the unequal material and social
preconditions across sections of the population as the institutional
base for success. This infers that we need to relate success to
the institutional context of a society. This means that a means
test will have very different meanings and social effects in a
social democratic welfare state like Sweden from that of a liberal
welfare state such as the United States because of their different
ideological and institutional context. The social policy implication
of the precondition to success seems to be the establishment
of a universal base of welfare provision. It has been generally
accepted that social policy in welfare states is underpinned by
a 'mixed ideology of welfare' rather than either universalism or
selectivism. The welfare state embraces a universal guarantee of
social protection against illness, disability and loss of income; but
it also uses contribution, means test, income test, and other social
criteria to distribute social welfare. Apparently, even the most
social democratic welfare state, Sweden, has work tested and
means tested benefits. In other words, the operation of welfare
states according to the 'mixed ideology of welfare' reminds us that
welfare states are more pluralist than universalist or residualist
(Pinker, 1992). The major difference among welfare states is the
different ideological and institutional context, on top of it, selec-
tivity is being used. In other words, an important precondition
for a less-stigmatized selective approach for the 'mixed ideology
of welfare' is one with a universal base of welfare provision.
However, it is clear that either advanced or newly industrial
countries have to place great emphasis on the need to maintain
economic competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy.
This means that conception of the fiscal base and corresponding
political support for the use of universal social services has be-
come pessimistic; thus, would there be any acceptable ground for
the conditional use of selective means such as a means test?
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In the following, two social policy measures inferred from
the discussion in this paper are proposed. First, it was suggested
that the selective process, even individual based selectivity such
as a means test, is not necessarily stigmatizing; therefore, there
is a case to streamline the application procedure to make sure
that it is non-discretionary and non-humiliating as far as possible.
For example, transfer of benefits can be arranged by bank auto-
payment, a procedure more convenient to beneficiaries and free
from social stigma than the one requiring them to queue up before
the social security office. Moreover, beneficiaries should be given
more power, such as hotline and review authority for them to
redress grievances in case they are mistreated in the application
process. Second, as argued in this paper, students getting loans
and grants and public housing tenants in Singapore in general
do not have the social stigma despite the means tested selective
process. This implies that we can separate the selective process
from the social status of beneficiaries. It was also argued that it is
often the intrinsic attributes of beneficiaries and not the extrinsic
ones such as income, health care and other welfare benefits that
are stigmatizing. Hence, we should focus our attention to whether
the benefits being transferred would affect social status of ben-
eficiaries after the transfer. In other words, the concern of social
policy is not simply on the selective process where the negative
conception of means test derived, but also on the policy outcome,
which affects beneficiaries much longer in terms of time span.
This seems to be an area much neglected in the study of social
policy.
To conclude, we need to expand our attention in social policy
study of the selective stream of welfare from simply the selective
process. The ideological and institutional context makes a differ-
ence to the effect of selectivity. Stigmatization primarily reflects
our conception of social relations. If stigmatization results not
simply from the selective process, there is the case to extend our
study beyond the immediate process of the selective means. This
paper is not to propose a comprehensive re-appraisal of social
policy and welfare system, but it intends to cast a doubt on
conventional thinking about selectivism, selectivity by means test
in particular, of its narrow focus on the selective process. There is
the need for a more thoroughgoing review of the relation between
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the selective process and its ideological and institutional context,
as well as the possibility of any conditional use of means tests in a
socioeconomic environment that is not optimistic to the universal
approach of welfare.
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Notes
1. When the author visited Singapore in 1993, the median household income
there was one thousand Singapore dollars, but I was told that the top
household income ceiling for the government's home ownership scheme
was set at seven thousand dollars. This meant that nine out of ten Singa-
poreans were eligible for government built properties.
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